

# Face De-identification

**DATA PRIVACY LAB**  
Carnegie Mellon


## Face De-Identification

[privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/video/](http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/dataprivacy/projects/video/)

Probable Cause "catch 22:" something useful MAY be on a video recording related to a crime, but without viewing the video cannot get a search warrant to access the video.


Want to retain privacy protections afforded by US Constitution and the need for search warrant yet enable more sharing of video.

Can we share video with law-enforcement such that no matter how good face recognition software might become, people cannot be re-identified without due process?



## Face Recognition Example

Goal: De-identify faces such that no face recognition software can be successful, even if face recognition software is perfect.



Newton, Sweeney, and Malin. Preserving Privacy while Identifying Facial Images. *IEEE Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering*, Feb 2005.



## Ad Hoc Schemes that Don't Work

**Mouth Only**  
✓ Grayscale  
✓ Black & White

**Single Bar Mask** **T- Mask**

**Ordinal** **Pixelation**

In each of these, face recognition software can be trained on the method and the result yields successful re-identifications!





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## k-Same anonymizing faces

Thwarts face recognition while many facial details remain!

-Pixel  
-Eigen



$k =$  2 3 5 10 50 100

Latanya Sweeney, PhD

## k-Same Works even as Face Recognition Software Improves

Theorem. There cannot exist any face recognition software for which a subject's k-Samed image can be correctly recognized better than  $1/k$  probability.

**Lessons learned**

Ad hoc techniques don't work.

Useful images can be shared to detect suspicious activity, yet privacy protections are afforded.